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THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF VALUEADDED TEACHER ASSESSMENT POLICIES

Preston C. Green III*
Bruce D. Baker**
Joseph Oluwole***
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, numerous political think-tanks have
claimed that teacher evaluation systems must be strengthened
to prevent the granting of tenure to incompetent teachers. 1
Several states have responded to these criticisms by requiring
teachers to be evaluated in part based on the academic
achievement of their students. 2 Colorado, Louisiana, and
Tennessee have required their teacher evaluation systems to be

* Harry Lawrence Batschelet ll Chair Professor of Educational Administration,
Professor of Education and Law, Penn State University.
**Associate Professor of Education, Rutgers University.
***Assistant Professor of Education, Montclair State University.
1. Authors of The Widget Effect from The New Teacher Project, in a study of
twelve districts in four states, claim that 99% of tenured teachers in districts using a
satisfactory/unsatisfactory evaluation system received a positive rating. The same
study claims that in districts with more ratings options, 94% of teachers still received
the two highest rating options and less than 1% received a rating of unsatisfactory.
DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TCHR. PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT: OUR
NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESS (2d ed. 2009), available at http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/
TheWidgetEffect.pdf. While the findings are striking, the study has come under fire for
poor documentation of methods, leading to concerns that the findings are significantly
overstated. RAYMOND L. PECHEONE & RUTH C. WEI, REVIEW OF "THE WIDGET EFFECT:
0UH NATIONAL FAILUHE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON TEACHER DIFFEHENCES" (2009),
available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/TTR-Pecheonc-WIDG l~T.pdf.
2. This trend may be the result of President Ohama's "Race to the Top Program,"
by which the Department of l~ducation provides $4.35 billion for educationally
innovative programming. It has also encouraged states to revamp their teacher
evaluation policies to include student achievement data. Andrew J. Rotherham, Rating
Teachers: The Trouble with Value-Added Data, TIME, Sept. 23, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2020867,00.html.
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based 5m1) or more on the academic growth of the students.-' At
the time of submission of this article, only a handful of states
had taken such bold steps. But, by the time of our final edits,
18 states had overhauled teacher evaluation requirements with
14 requiring that at least 40<% of teacher evaluation consist of
student performance measures. 4 While the attempts to link
teacher evaluations to student achievement may seem
reasonable on their face, the primary approach for doing so,
called value-added modeling (VAM), suffers from substantial
technical problems that may result in an alarming number of
good teachers being falsely identified as "ineffective" and
eventually terminated. This may be especially true in states
adopting policies requiring 50% or more of their teacher
evaluations to be based on student achievement scores.
This article examines the framework and potential legal
problems of such teacher evaluation policies. The second
section below provides an overview of those states that have
adopted evaluation programs that are based 50<1() or more on
student achievement scores. The third and fourth sections
identify some of the technical problems associated with valueadded measures and discuss how teacher evaluation plans that
overly rely on student achievement data may be vulnerable to
legal challenges. The final section observes that random
teacher assignments, though problematic for removing
discretion from school districts, are the best way to minimize
legal and other challenges to teacher evaluation policies that
rely 50% or more on student achievement scores.

II. PROGRAMS IN WHICH STUDENT PERFORMANCE IS THE BASIS
OF 50% OR MORE OF TEACHER EVALUATIONS

Colorado, Louisiana, and Tennessee have enacted teacher
evaluation systems requiring 50% or more of the evaluations to
be based on students' academic growth. This section
summarizes the evaluation systems in these states, as well as
the procedural protections provided for teachers deemed
ineffective.

:l. See infra Part I I.
4. NJ\T'L COUNCIL ON TCHIL QUALITY, STATE OF THE STATES: TilENIJS ,\Nil Ec\IlLY
LESSONS ON TEJ\CHEI{ EVJ\LUJ\TION 1\Nll EFFEC'l'IVI•:NESS !'OLICII•:s (Oct. 2011). cwailah/e
at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/netq_ stateOfl'heStatl's.pdf.
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Colorado

Colorado's statute on licensed personnel evaluations in the
area of education creates a state council for educator
effectiveness to advise the State Board of Education. 5 A major
goal of this council is to aid in the creation of teacher
evaluation systems that "will ensure that every teacher is
evaluated using multiple fair, transparent, timely, rigorous,
and valid methods." 6 Considerations of student academic
growth must comprise at least 50% of each evaluation. 7 Quality
measures for teachers must include "measures of student
longitudinal academic growth," such as "interim assessment
results or evidence of student work, provided that all are
rigorous and comparable across classrooms and aligned with
state model content standards and performance standards." 8
These quality standards must take into account diverse factors,
including "special education, student mobility, and classrooms
with a student population in which ninety-five percent meet
the definition of high-risk student." 9
Colorado's statute also calls for school districts to develop
appeals procedures for teachers and principals found
wanting. 10 A teacher or principal who is deemed ineffective
must receive written notice, the documentation used for
making this determination, and identification of the
deficiency. 11 Furthermore, the school district must ensure that
a tenured teacher who disagrees with this designation has "an
opportunity to appeal that rating, in accordance with a fair and
transparent process developed, where applicable, through
collective bargaining." 12 If no collective bargaining agreement
is in place, then the teacher may request a review "by a

5. COLO. HEV. STAT.§ 22-9-105.5(2)(a) (2010).
6. /d.§ 22-9-105.5(3)(a).
7. !d.
8. !d.
9. /d. The statute also calls for the creation of performance evaluation councils
to advise school districts. /d. § 22-9-107(1). The performance evaluation councils also
help school districts develop teacher evaluation systems that must be based on the
same measures as those developed by the state council for educator effectiveness. !d. §
22-9-1 06(1 )(e)(! I). However, the performance evaluation councils lose their authority to
set standards once the state board has promulgated rules and the initial phase of
statewide implementation has been completed. !d.§ 22-9-106(l)(e)(l).
10. /d.§ 22-9-106(3.5)(b)(ll).
11. !d. § 22-9-106(3.5)(b)(l).
12. /d. § 22-9-1 06(3.5)(b)(ll).
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mutually agreed-upon third party." 13 The school district or
Board for Cooperative Services must develop a remediation
plan to correct these deficiencies to include professional
development opportunities that are intended to help the
teacher achieve an effective rating in her next evaluation. 14
The teacher or principal must receive a reasonable amount of
time to correct such deficiencies. 15

B.

Louisiana

Louisiana's Professional Employee Quality Development
Act requires every teacher to be evaluated annually by a local
school board. 16 By the start of the 2012-2013 school year, 60%1
of teacher evaluations will be based on evidence of studentachievement growth "using a value-added assessment model as
determined by the board for grade levels and subjects for which
value-added data is [sicJ available." 17 Where value-added data
are unavailable, the board will establish the growth measures.
The model must take into account other factors, including
students with disabilities, students eligible for free and
reduced lunch, student attendance, and student discipline.'~
The board must place teachers who are found to be
ineffective in an intensive assistance program 19 after informing
teachers in writing of their need for intervention. 20 The
assistance program must include at a minimum: (1) steps
needed for the teacher to improve; (2) assistance that the board
will provide; (3) a time line, not exceeding two years, to achieve
the objectives; and (4) actions to be taken if the teacher fails to
improve. 21 If the teacher fails to complete the assistance
program in compliance with the Act, or if the teacher is deemed
"ineffective after a formal evaluation conducted immediately
upon completion of the program," then the board must "timely
initiate termination proceedings." 22

1:l.
11.
15.
1 G.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

!d.
/d. § 22-9-1 OG(:l.5)(b)(l)-(ll).

!d.
L,\,

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
ld.
!d.

R~:v.

STAT. i\NN. § 17::l902(i\) (2010).

§ 17::l902(B)(5).

§ 17::l902(C)(2).
§ 17:il902(C)(2)(a).
§ 17::3902(C)(2)(b).
§ 17::l902(C)(2)(b)(v).
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Tennessee

Tennessee's evaluation statute, titled "Tennessee First to
the Top Act of 2010," creates a teacher evaluation advisory
committee to develop an annual evaluation for all teachers. 23
The Act stipulates that 50% of the evaluation criteria must
consist of student achievement data. Thirty-five percent (35%)
of that percentage must be based on the Tennessee ValueAdded Assessment System (TVAAS) or a comparable test for
student growth if no TVAAS data are available. 24 The
remaining 15%) must be mutually agreed upon by the evaluator
and the teacher being evaluated. 25 Other mandatory criteria
for teachers include: (1) review of previous evaluations; (2)
personal conferences, including discussion of strengths,
weaknesses, and remediation; and (3) classroom or position
observation followed by a written evaluation. 26 The Act also
requires the committee to develop a local-level grievance
procedure, which enables teachers to challenge the accuracy of
the data used to evaluate the teacher and compliance with the
statute's evaluation policies. 27

III. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF VALUE-ADDED MODELING 28
As noted in the prior section, three states base 50% of their
teacher evaluation systems on student achievement data. Most
2:l. Sec generally T~;NN. CODE ANN.§ 49-1 (2010).
21. ld. § 19-1-Cl02(d)(2)(A)(i).
25. Jd. § 49-1-:J02(d)(2)(A)(ii).
26. ld. § 49-1-302(d)(2)(B).
27. ld. § 49-1-302(d)(2).
28. In this article, we address specifically value-added modeling, a statistical
technique which attempts to attribute (with causal inference) student learning gains to
teachers of record for those students. A handful of states including Colorado have
adopted a method referred to as "student growth percentile" scores which arc a
descriptive measure used to characterize student achievement growth including
average student achievement growth of classes of students. These measures are not
intended for making inferences about teacher effectiveness. See Bruce D. Baker, Take
Your SGP and VAMit, Damn it!, SCHOOL FINANCE 101 (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://schoolfinance 101. wordpress.com/20 11/09/02/take-your-sgp-and -vamit-damn-it/;
Damian W. Bctehenner et a!., Student Grown Percentiles and Shoe Leather, EDUC.
NEWS COLO. (Sept. 1:l, 2011), http://www.ednewscolorado.org/2011/09/1:3/21400student-[.,'Towth-percentiles-and-shoe-leather. Yet, state officials have proposed that
these measures he used for evaluating teacher effectiveness. See Bruce D. Baker,
Piloting the Plane on Musical Instruments & Using SGPs to Evaluate Teachers,
SCHOOL FINANCE 101 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://schoolfinancelOl.wordpress.com/
2011109/22/piloting-the-plane-on-musical-instruments-using-sgps-to-evaluateteachers/.
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of the VAM teacher ratings thereby generated attempt to
predict the influence of the teacher on the student's end-of-year
test score, given the student's prior test score and descriptive
characteristics-for example, whether the student is poor, has
a disability, or is limited in her English language proficiency. 29
These statistical controls are designed to account for the
differences that teachers face in serving different student
populations.
There are, however, many problems associated with using
VAM to determine whether teachers are effective. Among these
problems are the instability of teacher ratings, classification
and model prediction error, unreliable results from different
"standardized" tests, difficulties in isolating a single teacher's
contribution to students' learning, the non-random assignment
of students across teachers, schools, and districts, and the
struggle for teachers to even receive VAM ratings. This section
details how these problems undermine the effectiveness of
using VAM teacher ratings to evaluate the effectiveness of
teachers.

A.

Instability of Teacher Ratings

The assumption m VAM for estimating teacher
"effectiveness" is that if one uses data on enough students
passing through a given teacher each year, one can generate a
stable estimate of the teacher's contribution to the students'

29. Valm~-added ratings of Lt,achcrs are generally not based on a simplt>
subtraction of each student's fall Lt,st score from the following spring's Lest scon' for a
specific subject. Such an approach would clenrly disadvantage teaclwrs who happ<•n to
serve less motivated groups of students or students with more difficult honw livt's
and/or fewer family resourct's to support thPir academic progrPss throughout the year.
It would be even more problt,matic to use tlw spring tPst score from tht' prior Y''ar as
the baseline score for comparison with the spring tt~st scon• of tlw currPnt year to
uvaluate the current teacher hecause the teacher had little control ovn any learning
gain or loss that may have occurred during the prior summer. Additionally, tlwse gains
and losses tend to hP different f(Jr students of higher and lower sociopconomic status.
See Karl L. Alexanlkr et al., School8, Achieuement, and Inequality: A Seasonal
l'erspectiue, 2:i EDUC. EVALUATION & 1'01/Y A:--IALYSIS 171 (2001). Recent findings from
a study funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation confirm these "st~asonal"
effects: "The norm sample results imply that students improvt' their n•ading
compn,hension scores just as much (or mort>) betwet'n April and Octohpr as betw<'l'll
October and April in the following grade. Scores may be rising as kids mature and gl't
more practice outside of school." BILL & MI•:LINilA GATES FOUNil., LE,\f{:--11:--IC: ABOUT
TEACHI:--JC: INITIAL FINlllNC:S FROM THE MI•:ASUJ{ES OF E~'FI•:<"I'IVI·: TI·:ACHINC: I'Ho.n:cT H
available at http://www.metproject.org/downloads/l'ndiminary Findings(201 0),
Hesearc h_l'aper. pdf.
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achievement gains. 30 This assumption is problematic because
of the concept of inter-temporal instability: that is, the same
teacher is highly likely to get a very different value-added
rating from one year to the next. The year-to-year correlation
for a teacher's value-added rating is only about 0.2 or 0.3-at
best a very modest correlation. Sass also notes that:
About one quarter to one third of the teachers in the bottom
and top quintiles stay in the same quintile from one year to
the next while roughly 10 to 15 percent of teachers move all
the way from the bottom quintile to the top and an equal
proportion fall from the top quintile to the lowest quintile in
the next year. 3 1
Furthermore, most of the change or difference in the
teacher's value-added rating from one year to the next is
unexplainable-by
differences
in
observed
student
characteristics, peer characteristics, or school characteristics. 32
Similarly, preliminary analyses from the Measures of
Effective Teaching Project, funded by the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, found:
When the between-section or between-year correlation in
teacher value-added is below .5, the implication is that more
than half of the observed variation is due to transitory effects
rather than stable differences between teachers. That is the
case for all of the measures of value-added we calculated. 33
While some statistical corrections and multi-year analysis
might help, it is hard to guarantee or even be reasonably sure
that a teacher would not be dismissed simply as a function of
unexplainable low performance for two or three years in a row.

B.

Classification and Model Prediction Error

Another technical problem of VAM teacher evaluation
systems is classification and/or model prediction error. In a
study funded by the U.S. Department of Education, researchers
at Mathematica Policy Research Institute carried out a series
:lO. TIM R. SASS, THE STABILI'I'Y OF VALUE·AilllEil M";ASURES OF n;ACHI.;R
QUALITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHER COMPENSATION POLICY (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001266_stabilityofvalue.pdf. See also Daniel F.
McCaffrey et a!., The Intertemporal Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4 Enuc.
FIN. & POI;Y 572 (2009).
ill. SASS, supra note ilO, at 2.
il2. ld.
:3:3. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 29, at 19.
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of statistical tests and reviews of existing studies to determine
the identification "error" rates for ineffective teachers when
using typical value-added modeling methods. 34 The report
found:
Type I and II error rates for comparing a teacher's
performance to the average are likely to be about 25 percent
with three years of data and 35 percent with one year of data.
Corresponding error rates for overall false positive and
negative errors are 10 and 20 percent, respectively. 35

Type I error refers to the probability that based on a certain
number of years of data, the model will find that a truly
average teacher performed significantly worse than averageY'
Thus, there is about a 25% chance if using three years of data
or a 35% chance if using one year of data that a teacher who is
"average" would be identified as "significantly worse than
average" and potentially be fired. Of particular concern is the
likelihood that a "good teacher" is falsely identified as a "bad"
teacher-in this case a "false positive" identification. According
to the study, this occurs one in ten times given three years of
data and two in ten times given only one year of dataY

C.

Same Teachers, Different Tests, Different Results

Determining whether a teacher is effective may vary
depending on the assessment used for a specific subject area
and not whether that teacher is a generally effective teacher in
that subject area. For example, Houston uses two standardized
tests each year to measure student achievement: the state
Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) and the
national Stanford Achievement Test. 3 ~ NYU Professor Sean
Corcoran and colleagues used Houston Independent School
District (HISD) data from each test to calculate separate valueadded measures for fourth- and fifth-grade teachers. 39 The
:l!l.

PI,TEH Z. SCHOCH I•:'!'

& HANLEY S. CHIAN<:, U.S. DI•:I''T ElllW., EIUlOI( IlATES IN

MK\SUIUNC: Tl·:i\CHEI( ,\Nil SCHOOL l'l•:llFORMi\NCE Bi\SIW ON STUDENT TI•:ST SCOil!o:

(.July. 201 0), cwailable at http:!/iPs.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/201 O!IO(H/pdt/201 ()I[()(H.pdf.
:l5. /d. at i.
:36. !d. at 12.
:l7. /d. at i.

GAINS

:l8.

SK\N 1'. CORCOIL\'l ET i\L., AN'li•:NBim<: INS'I'ITUTI·: FOR SCHOOL i{EFOill\1, C.\K

T~:ACHEilS BE EVi\LUi\'n:D BY THEIR STU!lE:--JTS' TI·:ST Sco1n:s'! SHOULD 'I'HI•:Y BE'' THE

USE OF Vi\LUJo:-AilllEIJ MEASURES OF '!'I•:ACH Jo:l( EFFEC'I'IVEKESS IN I'OLICY ,\Nil I'IL\CTICI•:

1:3 (201 0), available at http://annenlwrginstitute.org/pclf/valueaddedreport.pdf.

:l!1. See /d. at 17.
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authors found that a teacher's value-added rating can vary
considerably depending on which test is used. 40 Specifically:
[A]mong those who ranked in the top category (5) on the
TAKS reading test, more than 17 percent ranked among the
lowest two categories on the Stanford test. Similarly, more
than 15 percent of the lowest value-added teachers on the
TAKS were in the highest two categories on the Stanford. 41

Recent findings from the Bill and Melinda Gates'
Foundation's Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project
were quite similar to those of Corcoran. 42 While the MET
report authors downplayed low correlations between teacher
ratings generated by different tests, independent reviewer,
University of California at Berkeley economist Jesse Rothstein
explained:
The study finds that the measures are related, but only
modestly. The report interprets this as support for the use of
value-added as the basis for teacher evaluations. This
conclusion is unsupported, as the data in fact indicate that a
teachers' [sic] value-added for the state test is not strongly
related to her effectiveness in a broader sense. Most notably,
value-added for state assessments is correlated 0.5 or less
with that for the alternative assessments, meaning that many
teachers whose value-added for one test is low are in fact
quite effective when judged by the other. 43

Similar issues apply to tests on different scales: different
possible ranges of scores or different statistical modification or
treatment of raw scores-for example, whether student test
scores are first converted into standardized scores relative to
an average score or expressed on some other scale such as
percentile rank (which is done in some cases but would
generally be considered inappropriate). For instance, if a
teacher is typically assigned higher performing students and
the scaling of a test is such that it becomes very difficult for
students with high starting scores to improve over time, that
teacher will be at a disadvantage. However, another test of the

10. !d.
11. !d.
42. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., WORKING WITH TEACHERS TO DEVELOP FAIR
AND i{ELIABLE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVE TEACHING (June 2010), available at
http://www.metproject.org/downloads/met-framing-paper.pdf.
43. JESSE i{OTHSTEIN, REVIEW OF LRARNTNG ABOUT TEAClllNG 1 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://nepc.colorado.ed u/files/TTR-MET-Hothstein. pdf.
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same content or another test with a different scaling of scores
(so that smaller gains are adjusted to reflect the relative
difficulty of achieving those gains) may produce an entirely
different rating for that teacher.

D.

Difficulty in Isolating Any One Teacher's Influence on
Student Achievement

It is difficult, if not entirely infeasible, to isolate one specific
teacher's contribution to students' learning, leading to
situations where a teacher might be identified as a bad teacher
simply because her colleagues are ineffective. This is called the
spillover effect. 44 For students who have more than one teacher
across subjects (and/or teaching aides/assistants), each
teacher's value-added measures may be influenced by the other
teachers serving the same students. Northwestern University
Professor Kirabo ,Jackson and researcher Elias Bruegmann, for
example, found in a study of North Carolina teachers that
students perform better, on average, when their teachers have
more effective colleagues. 45 University of Missouri Professor
Cory Koedel found that reading achievement in high school is
influenced by both English and math teachers. 46 These
spillover effects mean that teachers assigned to weaker teams
of teachers might be disadvantaged through no fault of their
own.

E.

Non-Random Assignment of Students Across Teachers,
Schools, and Districts

The fact that teacher value-added ratings cannot fully be
disentangled from patterns of student assignment across
schools and districts leads to the likelihood that teachers
serving larger shares of one population versus another are
more likely to be identified as effective or ineffective through
no fault of their own. This non-random assignment problem
relates not to the error in the measurement of test scores, but
to the complications of applying a statistical model to real-

·11. Cory Koedcl, An l~mpirical Analysis of Teacher Spillmwr J~ffccts in Secondary
School. 2H EcoN. I~IlUC. J{~;v. f:i82 (2009).
45. C. Kiraho .Jackson & Elias Bruegmann, Tcachinu Students and Tmchinu
l~ach Other: The Importance of l'Per Learninu for Teachers, 1 AM. ECON. ,J.: AI'I'LIE!l
ECON. i'\5 (2009).
4f:i.

KoedPI, supra note 11, at 691.
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world conditions. The fairest comparisons between teachers
would occur in a case where teachers were randomly assigned
to comparable classrooms with comparable resources and
where exactly the same number of students were randomly
assigned to those teachers. Teachers would then have the same
number of children with similar family backgrounds, prior
performance, personal motivation, and other characteristics.
Such circumstances, however, are unrealistic. Students are
not sorted randomly across schools, districts, or teachers within
schools. Nor are teachers randomly assigned across school
settings with equal resources. Instead, it is likely that one
fourth-grade teacher in a school is assigned more difficult
students year after year than another. This may occur by
choice of that teacher, having a desire to try to help such
students, or by other factors, such as the desire of a principal to
make a teacher's work more difficult. While most value-added
models contain some crude indicators of poverty status,
language proficiency, and disability classification, few, if any,
sufficiently mitigate the bias that occurs as a result of nonrandom student assignment. Bias stems from such apparently
subtle forces as the influence of peers on one another and the
inability of value-added models to sufficiently isolate the
teacher effect from the peer effect, both of which occur in the
classroom. 47 In fact, University of California, Berkeley
Professor Jesse Rothstein notes that "[r]esults indicate that
even the best feasible value added models may be substantially
biased, with the magnitude of the bias depending on the
amount of information available for use m classroom
assignments." 4 g
17. Th(,re exist at least two different approaches to control peer group
composition. One approach involves constructing measures of the average Pntry level of
performance for all other students in the class. Caroline M. Hoxby & Gretchen
Wcingarth, Malcolm Wiener Inequality & Social Policy Seminar Series, Taking Race
Out of the Equation: School Reassignment and the Structure of Peer Effects (Mar. 20,
2006).
available
at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/inequality/Seminar/Papers/
Hoxby06.pdf. Another involves constructing measures of the average racial and
socioeconomic characteristics of classmates. Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin,
School Quality and the Blach- White Achievement Gap (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12651, 2006), available at http://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/
classes/eco7:321/papers/hanushek%,20rivkin%2002.pdf.
18. Jesse Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value Added Estimation:
Selection on Observables and Unobservables (Nat'! Bureau of !~con. Research, Working
Paper No. 11666, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ w14666.pdf?
new_ window=]. See also .Jesse \{othstein, Teacher Quality in Educational Production:
Traching, Decay, and Student Achievement, 125 Q.J. ECON. 175 (2010). Many advocates
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Value-added modeling has more recently been at the center
of public debate after the Los Angeles Times contracted RAND
Corporation economist Richard Buddin to estimate value-added
scores for Los Angeles teachers, 49 and the Times reporters then
posted the names of individual teachers classified as effective
or ineffective on their web site. 50 The fairly typical model used
by Buddin produced technical documentation rich with
evidence of the types of model bias described by Rothstein and
others. 51 For example:
• Ninety-seven percent of children in the lowest
performing schools and 55%> m higher performing
schools are poor;
• The number of gifted children m a class affects the
teacher's value-added estimate positively; -the more
gifted children, the higher the teacher's effectiveness
rating;
• Black teachers have lower value-added scores for both
English Language Arts and math than white teachers;
• Having more black students in a class is negatively,
albeit minimally, associated with teacher's value-added
scores;
• Asian teachers have higher value-added scores than
white teachers for Math, with a positive association
of value-added approaches point to a piece by Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger as
downplaying l{othstein's concerns. Thomas .J. Kam: & Douglas 0. Staiger·. J.;,,timating
Teczcher impacts on Student Achi!'u!'ment: An Hxperimental gualuation (Nat'! Bun•au of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11607, 200/'l), auailable at http://www.nher.ot'g/
papers/w11607.pdf/new_window=l. However, wit.h n:gard to tlw Karw and Staiger
analysis, Eric Hanushek and SteVl:n l{ivkin explain: "the possiblt: uniqtwness of t.lw
sample and the limitations of tht: specification test suggest can: in interpn•t.ation of tlw
results." Eric A. Hanushek & Stevt:n G. Rivkin, Presentation for the Anwrican
Economic Association, Genaalizations about Using Valu.e-Add<'d Measure's of' Teuch<'r
Quality 7 (.Jan. :l-5, 201 0), uuailahle at http://www.utdallas.edu/n:search/tsperc/pdt/jrnl_hanushek_rivkin_201 0_ teacher_quality.pdf.
19. Richard Buddin, How gllectiue Are Los Angeles J,;zementary 'fhu·hers and
Schools( (MI'RA Paper No. 27:lnG, Aug. :ll. 2010), available at http:l/mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/27:-l()()/1 /M I']{A_paper_27:l66. pdf.
50. See, e.g., L.A. Tchr. Ratings, L.A. TIMES, http://projects.latinws.com/valueadded/ (last visited .Jan. 19, 2012).
G1. See generally Buddin. supra note 19. Derek Briggs and B(•n Domingm• of the
University of Colorado conductt•d re-analysis of the L.A. Times data, showing t.hat with
modest model improvements (over the original Buddin model), some of the bias could
be removed. See DEilEK !lRJ(:t:s & BJ•;N DOMINt:LJE, NA'r'L EllUC. J'OJ,'y CJ·;NTEJ{, DUJ·;
DILIGI<;NCE ANIJ THE EVALUATION CW Ti<:ACHIWS: A REVIEW OF THE V,\LUE-Aillllm
ANALYSIS lJN!lEHLYINC: THE EFFJ<:CTIV";N,;ss RANKINUS OF LOS ANW:LI•:S U:-.JIFIJ<:Il
SCHOOL DISTRICT TEACHimS IW THE LOS ANUF:UcS 'f'!Mfo.'S (Feb. 2011). tWClilab/e at
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/N !~PC- RB-I ,AT-V AM_O. pdf.
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between Asian race and math-teaching effectiveness
being as strong as the negative association for black
teachers. 52
Some of these associations above are explained by related
research by Stanford University Senior Fellow Eric Hanushek
and Amherst College Professor Steven Rivkin, which shows
measurable effects of the racial composition of peer groups on
individual students' outcomes and explains the difficulty in
distilling these peer effects from teacher effects. 53 Note that it
is also likely that the above findings associated with teacher
race are entangled with student race, so that black teachers are
more likely to be in classrooms with larger shares of black
students. 54
All value-added comparisons are relative. They can be used
for comparing one teacher to another in a school, teachers in
one school to teachers in another school, or teachers in one
district to those within other districts. The reference group
becomes critically important when determining the potential
for disparate impact of negative teacher ratings resulting from
model bias. For example, employing a district-wide
performance-based dismissal (or retention) policy in Los
Angeles using Buddin's model would likely result in
disproportionate layoffs of teachers in poor schools and black
teachers of black students, while disproportionately retaining
Asian teachers. 55 However, if one adopted the layoff policy
relative to within-school rather than district-wide norms,
because children are largely segregated racially and
economically by neighborhoods and schools, the disparate effect
might be lessened. The policy may neither be fairer nor better
in terms of educational improvement, but racially disparate
dismissals might be reduced.
Finally, because teacher value-added ratings cannot be
disentangled entirely from patterns of student assignment
across teachers within schools, principals may manipulate
assignment of difficult and/or unmotivated students in order to
compromise a teacher's value-added ratings, increasing the
principal's ability to dismiss that teacher. This concern might
52. Jd. 6, 7, 12, 16, and 14, respectively.
53. Hanushek & Rivkin, supra note 47.
51. Charles T. Clotfelter et a!., Who Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of
Nouice Teachers, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 377 (2005).
55. See Buddin, supra note 19, at 12-16.
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be mitigated by requirements for lottery-based student and
teacher assignments. However, such requirements could create
cumbersome student assignment processes that interfere with
achieving the best teacher match for each child.
Whereas the problem of stability and error rates above arc
issues of "statistical error," the problem of non-random
assignment is one of "model bias." Many value-added ratings of
teacher effectiveness suffer from both large degrees of error
and severe levels of model bias. The two are cumulative, not
overlapping, problems. In fact, the extent of error in the
measures may partially mask the full extent of bias.

Reduced Ability for Teachers to Receive VAM Ratings

F.

In addition to the substantial concerns regarding
"measurement error" and "model bias," which severely
compromise the reliability and validity of value-added ratings
of teachers as outlined above, in most public school districts,
far fewer than half of certified teaching staff could even be
assigned any type of value-added assessment score. While some
reports suggest that as many as 30<% might be assigned value
added scores, when data demands are increased for applying
more rigorous models, requiring more lagged student scores,
thus reducing grade levels evaluated, these figures may drop
significantly. 56 Existing standardized assessments typically
focus on reading or language arts and math performance
between grades three and eight. 57 Also, because baseline scores
are required-ideally multiple prior scores to limit model
bias-it becomes difficult to fairly rate third grade teachers. 5x
By middle school or junior high, students are interacting with
many more teachers, and it becomes more difficult to assign
value-added scores to any one teacher. 59 When considering the
56.

See, e.g.,

I{EI•'OHM,

'I'HI·:

CYNTHIA D. l'liiNCI•: ET /\L., CENTEI{ FOil EIJLJ('. CO~II'ENS,\TION

O'I'Him

69

P1mc1•:NT:

F,\lllLY

Rl·:wMWIN<:

THE

I'EI{FOil\1:\Ncl·:

oF

2009). cwai/oble ot
http://cccr.ed.gov/guides/othcr69Pcrcent.pdf; COIWOI\i\N ET .\L .• 8llpra note :J/l. Briggs
and Domingue's re-analysis of data from the L.A. '!'imPs study explains that c•ven
among th<• broad catPgory of ratable tpachl'rs, only a relatively small sharp could
actually lw assigned ratings through mon• data rich mmkls. See BlliC:< :s & DOIVIIN<: U E.
supra note 51. at 22.
TI·:ACIIEilS

OF

NONTI•:STEIJ

SUil.JECTS

/\Nil

GI\/\IJES

(Aug.

57. EVA L. BAKI.;Ji I•:T AL., ECON. I'OL'Y INST, l'lmllLI•:rvts WITH THE USJ•: OF STlllli·:NT
'l'J.:ST SC(}J(ES TO EV.\LUATI·: 'I'EACHI.;J/S !() (Aug. 29, 2010). rwailab/e at
http://epi.:kdn.net/721cd9a 1ch91 dOff() hwm6iij90.pdf.

58. SCHOCH ET & CHL\N<:. supra not<> :31, at 20.
59. See Koedel, 8upra note ·11. at 682.
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various support staff roles, specialist teachers, and teachers of
elective and/or advanced secondary courses, value-added
measures are generally applicable to only a small minority of
teachers in any school district (less than 30%). 60 Thus, in order
to make value-added measures a defined element of teacher
evaluation in teacher contracts, one must have separately
negotiated contracts for those teachers to whom these
measures apply. Unfortunately, this is administratively
cumbersome and potentially expensive for districts, especially
in such difficult economic times.
Washington DC's IMPACT teacher evaluation system is one
example that differentiates classes of teachers based on
evaluation by including or excluding value-added measures. 61
While contractually feasible, this approach creates separate
classes of teachers in schools and may have unintended
consequences for educational practices, including increased
tensions between non-value-added-rated teachers wishing to
pull students of value-added-rated teachers out of class for
special projects or activities.
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGES BY TERMINATED TENURED
TEACHERS

The previous section identified a number of technical issues
that limit the effectiveness of VAM teacher evaluation plans.
These technical problems make VAM teacher evaluation plans
vulnerable to legal challenges by terminated tenured
teachers. 62 Teachers may bring challenges pursuant to the Due

60. BAKER ET AL., supra note 57, at 12.
61. See generally, IMPACT GUlllEBOOKS, D.C. PUB. SCHS. (2011), available at
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCI'S/ln+the+Classroom/Ensuring+Teacher+Success/IMPACT+(l'erf
ormance+Assessment)/IMI'ACT+Guidebooks.
62. Teachers who have been transferred from a non-VAM grade to a VAM grade
might consider challenging the transfer. It is unlikely for these legal challenges to be
successful, however. If the tt)acher is transferred to a grade in which she is certified,
then she cannot make a challenge on Due Process Clause grounds. As the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Smith v. Sch. Dist. of Darby, 130 A.2d 661,
665 (I' a. 1957): "A professional employee, under the tenure provisions of the Code, does
not acquire a vested right to teach in any certain class or in any certain school. The
only limitation on a school board's general power is that the work to which a
professional employee is assigned be of a rank or class equivalent to that by which his
permanent status was acquired and one for which he is qualified." (internal citations
omitted). A teacher transferred from a non-VAM grade to a VAM grade might claim
that the transfer constitutes a demotion in violation of a teacher tenure statute. See,
e.g .. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1151 (1963) ("there shall be no demotion of any
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Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII. The
remainder of this section elaborates on these options.

A.

The Due Process Clause

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law." 63 The Due Process
Clause applies if the court determines that the plaintiffs have
been deprived of a life, liberty, or property interest, whether
procedurally or substantively. Procedural due process "(often
summarized as 'notice and an opportunity to be heard'), is a
right to a fair procedure or set of procedures before one can be
deprived of property by the state." 64 Substantive due process
"imposes limits on what a state may do regardless of what
procedural protection is provided." 65

1. Protected interest
To bring a Due Process Clause challenge, plaintiffs must
first show that the government has infringed upon a life,
liberty, or property interest. Plaintiffs may contend that a
teacher evaluation system that relies significantly on student
achievement data deprives them of a liberty interest.
Deprivation of a liberty interest imposes a "stigma or other
disability" that damages a person's standing in the community
or forecloses a person's "freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities." 66 On the other hand, "[a]
statement that is basically one alleging conduct that fails to
meet professional standards . . . does not impinge upon a
liberty interest." 67
professional employe [sic] either in salary or in type of position ... without the consent
of the l'mploye [sic], or, if such consent is not received, thpn such dpmotion shall he
subjPct to the right to a hearing hefon' ttw board of school dir'('(;tors and an ap]wal").
Howevr,r. a court is unlikdy to vit'W such a transfer as a "rkmotion" hr•cause tht•n• is no
loss in scdary or status. Sec Appeal of Santee, 156 A2d tno (Pa. 19!}\l) (finding that a
transfer from a secondary grade to an ekmentary grade was not a dPmotion ])('caust•
there was no difference in salary or prestige).
G:l. U.S. Co:-.JS'I'. amend. XIV.~ 1.
()·1. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.:ld 5()7, 571 (Gth Cir. 2000).
65. Fournier v. Reardon, 1GO F.:ld 7G1. 757 (1st Cir. 1998). For more on the lhw
Process Clause. sec Corinna B. Lain, The Unexceptionulism of "l~uoluing Standards." 57
UCLA L. REV. :165 (2009).
66. Bd. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, ·108 U.S. 5()<1, 57:l (1972).
67. Raposa v. Mead Sch. Dist. •H1-l, 790 F.2d 1:119, 1:l51 (Sth Cir. HlSf)) (holding
that school district's finding that teacher did not, inter alia, coo1wrate with otlwr

1] VALUE-ADDED TEACHER ASSESSMENT POLICIES

17

It is doubtful that teachers terminated on the basis of their
students' performance on achievement tests can establish a
liberty interest. St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 420 v. Board
of Education of St. Louis 68 supports this assertion. In this case,
the St. Louis, Missouri school district adopted an evaluation
system that called for certain teachers to be evaluated based on
the California Achievement Test (CAT). 69 Plaintiffs who had
received a preliminary score of "unsatisfactory" asserted that
this rating violated their liberty interest. 70 The district court
found that the school district's finding of "unsatisfactory" did
not implicate a liberty interest because the district merely
declared that the plaintiffs "did not meet professional
standards for that year." 71 Such a finding did not damage the
ability of the teachers to find employment elsewhere. 72
Plaintiffs terminated on the basis of student performance
might be able to establish a property interest, however.
Property interests "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law." 73 In Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court found that
tenured teachers had a property right to continued
employment derived from the state tenure statute. 74

2. Procedural due process
If plaintiffs can establish a protectable due process right,
they might argue that a teacher evaluation policy that relies
50% or more on standardized tests, for example, violates
procedural due process. Procedural due process is a flexible
concept in that the procedural protections afforded to
individuals depend on the demands of the particular situation.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court found that the
level of procedural due process depends on three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
teachers
68.
G9.
70.
71.

72.
7:3.
71.

or failed to teach required subjects did not impinge upon a liberty interest).
652 F. Supp. 425 (E. D. Mo. 1987).
Jd. at 127.
ld. at 4:l2.
!d.
/d.
Bel. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, 108 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985).
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interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 75

With respect to the first factor, courts have consistently
held that teachers have a considerable private interest in
retaining employment. 76 With regards to the second factor, the
risk of erroneous deprivation under value-added assessments is
quite substantial; there is a 26%1 chance if a school district uses
three years of data and a 35%J chance if using one year of data
that a teacher who is average would be identified as
significantly worse than average and potentially fired. To base
50% or more of a teacher evaluation on such a flawed
mechanism is therefore quite troubling.
The plaintiffs could argue that the governmental interest in
hiring effective teachers docs not outweigh these interests. It is
unclear how the consideration of other quality measures such
as "interim assessments results or evidence of student work" 77
will sufficiently mitigate the problem of overreliance on valueadded assessments. Moreover, as to fiscal concerns, "[i]t is
preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new
one."7X Furthermore, "the employer shares the employee's
interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions," 79 and
it is quite possible that a termination process with such a high
error rate might have a negative impact on the recruitment of
qualified teachers.

3. Substantive due process
Plaintiffs might also claim that a teacher evaluation system
that is based 50%) or more on student achievement violates
substantive due process. Substantive due process imposes
limits on what a state may do regardless of what procedural

75. 121 U.S. :n 9, :l:l5 (1976).
76. Louderrni/1, 170 U.S. at 51:1; Wash. TPachem' Union Local No. 6 v. Bd. of
Educ. of D.C., 109 F.:ld 77-1, 71-10 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Tex. FaculL~· 1\ss'n v. Univ. of TPx. at
Dall., 916 F.2d :l79, :li-11 (f>th Cir. 1991).
77. CoLO. HEV. STAT. § 22-9-1 05.5(:l)(a) (201 0).
78. Lou.dcrmill, •170 U.S. at :111 (finding that terminatPd tc•achPrs an• Pntit!Pd to a
pn,-termination hearing).
7~). /d.
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protection is provided. A substantive due process analysis then
requires that courts determine if the "life, liberty or property"
interest in question is a fundamental right~W-a right explicit
or implicit in the federal constitution. 81 If a fundamental right
is involved, the court reviews the legislative act using the strict
scrutiny standard of review. 82 Under this standard of review,
the burden is on the government to show that the legislative
act is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest. 83
If a fundamental right is not involved, the court reviews the
legislative act under the more lenient rational basis standard
of review. Under this standard, a violation of substantive due
process occurs only if the legislative act is not rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. 84 When an executive action or a
specific act of a government official is challenged, substantive
due process analysis requires courts to determine only if the
executive action "shocks the conscience." 85
If a tenured teacher is terminated due to the performance of
her students on tests, then a rational basis analysis would be
used because the termination occurred pursuant to a legislative
act and a fundamental right is not implicated. 86 It is critical to
point out that while plaintiffs have the burden of proof under
rational basis review, the state could lose its case if its actions
are arbitrary or irrational. 87 Plaintiffs in states where teacher

HO. Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 225, 158 F.:id 962, 965 (7th Cir.
1998).
81. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
82. /d.
H:i. ]{oe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (197:3), overruled in part on other grounds by
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 121 (2007).
81. FCC v. Beach Commc'n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 n.6 (1993).
1-\5. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 816-47 (1998).
86. No reported cases have addressed the question of whether tenured teachers
can be terminated based on student achievement scores pursuant to substantive due
process. Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 188 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 197:3)
(overturning lower court's finding that termination of teachers was arbitrary because
the tl'acher was untenured at the end of her contract); St. Louis Teachers Union, Local
120 v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, 652 F. Supp. 425 (E. D. Mo. 1987) (finding that tenured
teachers stated a cause of action challenging salary decisions of certain teachers on the
basis of student achievement test scores). lt is critical to note that the Supreme Court
has rull>d that education is not a fundamental right. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
87. See, e.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of N.Y. C., :350 U.S. 551, 556 (1956)
(quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 311 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) ("constitutional protection
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion [from public employment] pursuant
to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory"); Roth, 108 U.S. at 581 (quoting
Slodwwer, :!50 U.S. at 559) ("[Tjhe 'protection of the individual against arbitrary
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evaluations are based 50<% or more on value-added assessments
might be able to make a tenable case for irrationality. As
discussed, there is a 10%) to 20<% chance that a "good" teacher
will be falsely identified as a "bad" teacher. xx There are
significant error rates, too: 25%) with three years of data and
35% with one year of data. A court might find that the error
rates are so extreme as to not be rationally related to any
legitimate interest.
The high-stakes student testing case Debra P. u.
Turlington'!~.'> provides further support for a possible finding of
irrationality. In Debra P., Florida students challenged the
constitutional validity of a state requirement that as a
condition precedent to obtaining high school diplomas, students
must pass a state test. 90 The students contended that such usc
of the test violated their due process rights. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed, holding
that the use of the test violated the students' due process
property rights to a diploma due to a lack of adequate notice. 91
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
remanded the case for further findings as to whether the highstakes test "was a fair test of that which is taught in [Florida's]
classrooms." 92 The circuit court stated that if the test covered
content not actually taught in the state's classrooms, the test
would violate substantive due proccss, 93 opining that "the state
is obligated [under substantive due process] to avoid action
which is arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve or even
frustrates a legitimate state interest, or is fundamentally
unfair." 94 The court went on to conclude that the high-stakes
test may have violated substantive due process "in that it may
have covered matters not taught in the schools of the state." 95
The record was "simply insufficient in proof that the test
administered measures what was actually taught in the schools

action' ... [isj tlw very t•ssenct• of dul' procpss"): id. at S77 (protl•ct<•d pnlpc>rt:'i rights
cannot lw ''arbitrarily nndl'rmincd.").
SS. SC'IIOCHET & CHIANG, supra nok :H, at 12. See supra Part Ill. B.
S9. 171 F. Supp. 2,1,1 (M.D. Fla. 197~1), aff'd, 6,11 F.2d :m7 (Gth Cir. 19Sl).
90. !d.
(Jl. Debra 1'. v. Turlington, 6'1'1 1•'.2d :l97, '102 (5th Cir. 191-11).
92. !d. at 'lOR
9:l. !d. at '!0'1.
91. ld.
95. !d. at 106.
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of Florida." 96
On remand, the district court found that the high-stakes
test was instructionally valid and was therefore permissible
under substantive due process. The circuit court affirmed the
decision. 97 It rejected the notion that the state had to
demonstrate that the test covered materials actually taught in
the classroom because there were no accepted standards for
deciding whether a test was instructionally valid, 9 g concluding
instead that there was adequate evidence of its being
instructionally valid. 99 Among other things, the court was
impressed by the state's efforts to provide remedial instruction
to students who needed extra help mastering the skills on the
test, 100 as well as by a student survey finding that 90 to 95% of
the students believed that they had been taught the test
skills. 101
If a court were to adopt the Debra P. approach, it might
determine that a teacher evaluation program based 50% or
more on a value-added assessment, having a significant 25%
error rate with three years of data and 35% error rate with one
year of data, violates substantive due process. The crucial
question would be whether it is fundamentally unfair to base
the decision to terminate a teacher on an assessment with such
high error rates. The circuit court in Debra P. found
fundamental fairness only because the state of Florida
provided remediation for those students who failed the
examination. 102
Yet there is an important distinction between the highstakes test analyzed in Debra P. and the teacher evaluation
programs analyzed in this Article. In Debra P., the Fifth
Circuit found that there were "no accepted educational
standards for determining" what constitutes instructional
validity 103 and so the state's task in establishing the validity of
the high-stakes test was made relatively easy. By contrast, the
Economic Policy Institute states that "there is broad agreement

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
IO:l.

!d.
Dehra 1'. v. Turlington, 7:i0 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1984).
Jd. at 1109.
!d. at 1 ;J 11.
Jd.

!d.
!d. at 1111, 1116.
Jd. at l!J 12 n.4.
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among statisticians, psychometricians, and economists that
student test scores alone are not sufficiently reliable and valid
indicators of teacher effectiveness to be used in high-stakes
personnel decisions, even when the most sophisticated
statistical applications such as value-added modeling are
employed," 104 making it more difficult for VAM to receive court
approval.
Because of this consensus, a court may find that sole
reliance on a value-added assessment model would be
fundamentally unfair. Thus, the question the court may decide
to address under Debra P. is whether the other measurements
and remedial policies sufficiently counter the value-addedassessment system's inherent irrationality. All of the state
policies analyzed in this Article rely on remediation of teachers
who are deemed ineffective. However, as explained, it may be
more difficult to provide remediation for teachers whose
students fail to meet achievement benchmarks. A teacher could
do a wonderful job but not see academic gains because of the
socioeconomic, racial, and ability composition of her class. In
other words, remediation may be less effective because of
factors completely out of control of the teacher. Additionally, a
teacher who is indeed effective, yet forced to undergo
remediation due to a false identification based on the VAM,
might face consequent stigma.

B.

The Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 105 It "docs not forbid
classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers
from treating differently persons who are in all relevant
respects alike." 106
Courts generally use three levels of analysis for Equal
Protection Clause challenges. Governmental classifications
that implicate a fundamental right or target a suspect class arc
subject to strict scrutiny, which requires a narrow tailoring to
satisfy a compelling governmental interest. Quasi-suspect
classifications such as gender and illegitimacy are subject to

10,1. BAKEl( 1•:'1' AL., supra notl' ii7, at 2.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.~ I.
1Ofi. Nordlingl'r v. Hahn, 50!) U.S. 1. 10 (1992).
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intermediate scrutiny, requiring substantial relation to an
important governmental interest. All other classifications are
subject to a rational basis analysis, meaning that they will be
constitutional as long as they are rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. 107
Courts reviewing equal protection claims of tenured
teachers terminated because of their students' academic
performance will probably use a rational basis analysis
because: (1) no fundamental right is implicated; and (2)
terminated tenured teachers are not a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. In Debra P., the circuit court held that a high-stakes
student test that fails to cover the material within the
curriculum could not be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. In other words, "[i]f the test is not fair,
it cannot be said to be rationally related to a state interest." 108
It might be possible that the error rates of value-added
estimates might make teacher evaluation policies that are 50%
or more reliant on such tests "too unfair" or arbitrary to satisfy
the rational basis test, similar to the discussion under the Due
Process Clause.

C.

Title VII

The third section of this Article presented research
indicating that: (1) black students tend to fare worse on
standardized tests than white students; and (2) black teachers
are more likely to work in schools of low-income black
students. 109 Thus, it follows that black teachers are more likely
to be dismissed on the basis of poor value-added test scores.
This is especially true if states adopt teacher evaluation
systems that rely 50% or more on student standardized test
scores.
The potential racial impact of such systems may make them
vulnerable to challenges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which makes it unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race." 110 There are two types of

107.
108.
109.
110.

!d.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d :397, 406 (5th Cir. 1981).
See supra Part III.K
12 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010).
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Title VII challenges: (1) disparate treatment, which deals with
purposeful discrimination; and (2) disparate impact, which
addresses employment policies that are "fair in form but
discriminatory in operation." 111 While no doubt disparate
treatment cases may occur, it is much more likely that teacher
evaluation policies will be enacted without any provable racial
animus. For this reason, this Article analyzes racial effects
under a disparate impact analysis. 112
Courts apply a three-part, burden-shifting analysis for Title
VII disparate impact claims. 113 First, the plaintiffs must
establish a prima facie case, showing that a challenged practice
has an adverse impact on a minority group. 114 Once the
plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the employer to show that the employment practice in
question has a "manifest relationship to the employment"; 115 in
other words, the employer has to show a "business
justification." 116 If the employer satisfies this requirement, the
burden then shifts to the plaintiffs to establish that less
discriminatory alternatives exist. 117

111. Connecticut v. Teal. 157 U.S. 110, ·1fi:"i-56 (19H2) (quoting Griggs v. Dukt>
Co.,-101 U.S.121, ·1:n (1971)).
112. A purposeful discrimination challenge~ could also lw made pursuant to thl'
Equal Protection Clause. If plaintiffs could establish that purposeful discrimination
has occm'!'ed, tlw cast> would lw nnalyzed under strict scrutiny. which is th(• most
difficult Ievld of analysis for the government to overcom(,, If the plaintiffs can prOVl'
racially discriminatory purpose fi>r value-addc'd designs or ratings. eitlwr through
din~ct or circumstantial evidence, courts will not defer to thl' legislature. Such l'vidl'l1('('
could include "a cl(•ar pattern, ltn(•xplainable on grounds otht>r than ran•. !that]
emerges fi·om the d'feet of the stat(• action ''vl'n when the governing l<•git-dation apJWars
nt>utral on its face." Arlington Heights v. Metro. llous. Dcv. Corp., •129 U.S. 2:)2, 2GG
(1977). Other evidcncl' of discriminatory purpose could come from th<• "historical
background" of the enactment, design and/or use of tlw YAM. esjwcially "if' it l'<•veals a
st>ril's of official actions taken for invidious pmpost>s." !d. at 2G7. HoWl'V<'r. it would bt>
extremely difficult to find such (•vich,nce. See uencrally Arlington 1/eiuhts. •129 U.S.:
Wa~hington v. Davis, 12fi U.S. 229 (197G) (highlighting the difficult nature of Equal
Protection cases founded on racially discriminatory impact). Dut• to tlw difficulty in
proving raci:1l animus and tlw fact that in current times govt>rnment officials art> less
likely to leave a papl'r or electronic trail of such animus wlwn crafting policy or
legislation, it would be bdter for plaintiffs to focus on disparate impact Title VII
challenges since proof of discriminatory intent/purposl' is not requin,d.
1J:i. See, c.f{., ,12 U.S.C. 2000t>-2(k) and Gulino v. N.Y. State• Educ. Dep't. 160 F.:ld
:lfil, :m2 (2d Cir. 2006).
111. Gulino. 1()0 F.:ld at :lll2.
]]:), !d.
Powl~r

116. /d.
117. !d. In Wards Cow Packing Co. v. Atonio, ,190 U.S. G12. G59 (19H9). tlw
Suprt>ml' Court ht>ld that in Tit](' VII disparate impaet. '"t.ht> ultimate burden of
proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific
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Plaintiffs should have no difficulty establishing a prima
facie case of disparate impact. As noted above, black teachers
receive lower value-added scores than white teachers in at
least some existing publicly disclosed teacher effectiveness
(VAM) reports. 11 )l Additionally, even though relatively small,
there is a negative correlation between the number of black
students a teacher has and the teacher's VAM scores, 119 and
black teachers are more likely to work in majority-black
schools. 12 Furthermore, with research showing that it is
difficult to separate the effects of peer racial composition from
teacher effects on student performance, the racially disparate
impact of VAM cannot be trivialized. 121
Assuming that black teachers are able to establish a prima
facie case, the burden would then shift to the defendants to
establish a business justification for the teachers' dismissal.
The defendants would centrally argue as a business
justification the need to ensure that ineffective teachers are not
teaching students, for teacher quality determines student
performance. However, the fact that value-added tests are
riddled with error rate problems may make it difficult for the
defendant state to establish such a manifest relationship.
If the school district gets beyond the "business justification"
hurdle, plaintiffs might suggest that a less racially
discriminatory alternative would be to explicitly include
indicators of the racial mix of students in the class as part of
the teacher evaluation model. Doing so would hypothetically
compare teachers of classrooms of children where racial
composition of classrooms is statistically (albeit not practically)
equalized.
That is, teachers serving classrooms of
predominantly black students would be compared against
teachers serving classrooms of the same. In practice, many
value-added models like the Los Angeles Times model avoid

°

employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times."" (quoting Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1989) (emphasis in original)). In 1991,
Congress responded to Wards Cove by codifying the disparate impact analysis prior to
Wards Cove. 12 U.S.C. ~ 2000e-2(k)(l)(C) (2011). However, Congress failed to make
similar changt~s to other employment discrimination statutes, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. ~ 623 (2011). In Smith v. City of
.Jackson, 511 U.S. 228, 240 (2005), the Court held that pre-Wards Cove analysis applies
to ADEA claims.
118. See Buddin, supra note 19.
119. !d.
120. Clotfelter et al., supra note 54, at :l77.
121. Hanushek & Rivkin, supra note 4 7.
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including race variables despite knowing their importance in
resolving key modeling bias problems. While one can be
reasonably sure that typical value-added models do not entirely
mitigate racially disparate effects, even the most thorough
value-added models cannot guarantee such results.
V. RANDOMNESS: THE BITTERSWEET VAM PILL
The previous section noted that VAM for teacher
evaluations that rely 50%, or more on teacher scores may be
subject to a variety of legal challenges. These challenges arise
from the fact that VAM fails to adjust sufficiently for the
differences in student populations. In order for YAM to work, it
would be necessary to tackle the non-randomness problem in
student assignments and teaching conditions. 122 For example,
teachers might consider arguing for a "randomized student
assignment clause" in their collective bargaining agreements
("CBA") to require all students in any given grade level to be
randomly assigned to classrooms and schools, stratified by
student population characteristics including disabilities (by
type), language proficiency, socio-economic status, and race.
Teachers might also argue for more detailed "comparable
conditions" clauses in their CBAs. These comparable conditions
clauses would specify precisely the number of children to be
taught per class or section and the numbers and types of
children by various classifications (as per the random
assignment system). Additionally, teachers could argue for
comparable facilities, accommodations and other resources,
including air quality, heating, cooling, lighting quality,
materials, supplies, and equipment, and any other factors that
may bias teacher "effectiveness" ratings. Furthermore, where
teachers work in teams with students, requirements of rotating
schedules to ensure a distribution of "time of day" for students
in classes or sections might be considered.
However, while randomized assignments would help
address some of the concerns discussed in this article, the
potential for unintended consequences exists. For instance,
completely random assignment of students and random
matching of students to teachers and classrooms removes the
option for principals to work with teachers to determine the

122.

BAK 1m ET AL., supra nutt• 57. at ~J-11.
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best match for each child and eliminates the possibility for
teachers wishing to dedicate themselves to assisting more
difficult children. Establishing comparison groups so that
highly successful and predominantly white schools or districts
must dismiss x percent of their teachers yearly simply to erase
the racially disparate effect of dismissing x percent of teachers
in poor minority districts based on their school- or district-level
norms is equally absurd.
Moreover, these proposed contractual solutions might only
apply to a relatively small share of teachers in the system,
given the fact that only about 20% of teachers can be linked
directly to student performance measures in reading and
math. 123 Additionally, in most studies of the stability of valueadded measures, math performance measures have been found
much more stable than reading performance measures, and
reading performance measures are much more strongly
influenced by student learning outside the control of teachers
over the summer. 124 As such, contracts for teachers evaluated
via value-added measures must generally differ from those of
other teachers, and it may be necessary to include different
protections for teachers of reading than math to account for
different levels of model error and different effects of student
sorting based on differential summer learning patterns. For
example, while fall-spring assessments are more appropriate
than annual assessments for determining teacher effects in
either reading or math, it would appear more important to
include contractual requirements for fall-spring assessments
for rating teachers of reading.
The lack of randomness in student assignments that
typifies VAM effectively ensures that the system will remain
beset with other problems. The different pressures placed on
teachers of reading and math between grades three and eight
and other teacher specialists working with the same students
may create unintended curricular consequences. For instance,
a core-content-area teacher might refuse release time for those
students that would most help that teacher improve her valueadded ratings while encouraging release time or classroom
removal for more disruptive students that might negatively
12:3. See supra Part Ill.F, pointing out that standardized assessments currently
used mostly focus on language arts or reading and math performance between grades
three and eight.
124. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 29.
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impact her ratings. Furthermore, re-assignment of teachers
into and out of value-added-rated contractual categories,
including moving a teacher from second grade (not rated) to
third or fourth, may become much more cumbersome and even
lead to illicit backroom deals between teachers and
administrators as teachers seek to avoid falling into valueadded-rated categories. This could severely compromise the
integrity of the educational process and, indeed, student
achievement. Perhaps the least reasonable solution is simply to
test everything from kindergarten art work to the high school
jazz ensemble's performance in order to apply value-added
ratings to teachers responsible for each aspect of student work
as they pass through the school system. While seemingly
absurd, states including Tennessee have established
committees to explore this and other equally problematic
possibilities, including the evaluation of teachers in music and
art according to school average achievement growth in tested
subject areas or of counselors by student discipline referral
rates. 125 Alternatively, schools might simply choose to
discontinue offering anything that is not presently tested.

VI. CONCLUSION
In response to complaints about teacher evaluation
programs, several states have adopted VAM policies. Three
states have gone so far as to base 50%) of their teacher
evaluation policies on VAM. This Article advises against such
reliance on YAM because of the attendant technical and legal
problems. Random assignments provide the best possible
avenue for alleviating some of the problems identified, but even
then only as a bittersweet pill given the potential unintended
consequences. Unless randomness can be incorporated into
YAM models, the basic notion of fairness demands that states
refrain from relying on a flawed model with such high error
rates in determining the fate of their teachers. A 25<)1) chance of
error is not acceptable, while a 35% chance of erroneous
deprivation is unconscionable. Since VAM is in its incipiency,
states still have an opportunity to incorporate the above
suggestions to make the system fair and less susceptible to
125. Tennessee
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challenges, for, as noted author Orlando A. Battista once
stated, "[a]n error doesn't become a mistake until you refuse to
correct it." 126

126. QuoteH
by
Orlando
A.
Battista,
QUOTF:WORLD .ORG,
http://www.quoteworld.org/authors/orlando_a_hattista (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).

